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SALVAGING PROPORTIONATE 
PRISON SENTENCING: A REPLY TO 
RUMMEL V. ESTELLE 
American prison sentences as authorized by statute are among 
the longest in the world.1 Courts have used the eighth amend-
ment's proscription of "cruel and unusual punishments,"2 how-
ever, to mitigate the harshness of excessively long sentences, on 
the theory that the amendment prohibits prison terms grossly 
disproportionate to the severity of the crime. 3 For decades, the 
Supreme Court has recognized this disproportionality limitation 
on criminal sanctions,• and, until recently, permitted eighth 
amendment challenges to punishment regardless of the crime in-
volved or penalty imposed.11 In Rummel u. Estelle,6 though, the 
1. See ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 57 (1968). 
2. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. 
VIII. 
3. See, e.g., Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.) (30- to 60-year sentence for 
marijuana possession), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 993 (1975); Hart v. Coiner, 
483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973) (life sentence imposed under state recidivism statute follow-
ing defendant's conviction for three separate offenses: writing a $50 check on insufficient 
funds, transporting $140 in forged checks across state lines, and perjury), cert. denied, 
415 U.S. 938 (1974); Thacker v. Garrison, 445 F. Supp. 376 (W.D.N.C. 1978) (48- to 50-
year sentence imposed following conviction for safecracking); Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. 
Supp. 444 (W.D. Va. 1977) (40-year sentence imposed following conviction for possession 
with intent to distribute, and distribution of, less than nine ounces of marijuana), rev'd 
sub nom. Hutto v. Davis, 102 S. Ct. 703 (1982) (per curiam); People v. Lorentzen, 387 
Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972) (20-year minimum sentence imposed following convic-
tion for sale of marijuana); see also In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. 
Rptr. 217 (1972) (one-year-to-life sentence imposed following second conviction for inde-
cent exposure, relying on California Constitution). 
4. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) ("it is a precept of justice 
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense"); accord 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (a penalty violates the eighth amendment if 
"grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime"). For a discussion of the propor-
tionality principle as a constitutional limitation on punishment, see Radin, The Juris-
prudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989 (1978); Wheeler, Towards a Theory of Limited Punish-
ment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838 (1972). . 
5. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (challenging death sentence for the 
rape of an adult woman); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (reviewing imposition of 
death penalty for murder); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (eighth amend-
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Court suggested that proportionality principles do not limit the 
permissible length of prison terms levied on felons, because "the 
length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter 
of legislative prerogative."7 The Court in Rummel, therefore, 
shielded statutorily imposed prison sentences from constitu-
tional scrutiny in all but the most egregious cases. 8 
Although the reasoning of Rummel will thus be dispositive of 
eighth amendment challenges to sentence length brought under 
the federal constitution, state courts remain free to depart from 
the Supreme Court's analysis in interpreting state constitutional 
corollaries to the federal proscription of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. Indeed, several state courts already have rejected the 
Rummel approach in construing the scope of protection against 
severe punishment afforded by their state constitutions.9 Ac-
cordingly, the arguments advanced in Rummel demand critical 
attention. Part I of this Note provides a capsule of the Court's 
holding in Rummel. Part II argues, contrary to Rummel, that 
precedential support can be mustered to support eighth amend-
ment review of sentence length. Finally, part 11,1 discusses the 
continued viability of the proportionality test as a vehicle for 
assessing challenges to the length of imprisonment, and dis-
counts the concerns voiced in Rummel regarding the difficulty of 
judicial review of legislative sentencing decisions. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S REJECTION OF PROPORTIONALITY 
REVIEW 
In Rummel v. Estelle, the Supreme Court confronted the 
troubling question of whether a legislatively mandated life sen-
tence could be found violative of the eighth amendment's pro-
scription of cruel and unusual punishment. William Rummel 
had committed a series of felonious property offenses in Texas 
involving less than $230.10 After being convicted of his third fel-
ment attack upon punishment comprising 12 years at hard labor plus the 1088 of many 
civil rights for the crime of falsifying a public document). 
6. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
7. Id. at 274. 
8. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. 
9. See, e.g., State v. McDaniel, 228 Kan. 172, 612 P.2d 123 (1980) (sentence of 5 to 20 
years for aggravated robbery); Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 427 N.E.2d 17 (Mass. 1981) 
(sentence of 40 to 50 years for p088ession of a machine gun); State v. Fain, 94 Wash. 387, 
617 P.2d 720 (1980) (life sentence under habitual offender statute where underlying con-
victions involved use of fraud to obtain less than $470). 
10. Rummel was convicted in 1964 of fraudulently using a credit card to obtain $80 
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ony, for theft by false pretext,11 Rummel was sentenced to life 
imprisonment under the Texas "habitual offender" statute.11 
Following the affirmance of his conviction in state court, 18 Rum-
mel pursued habeas corpus review in the federal courts, alleging 
that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 
Rummel premised his claim for habeas relief not upon the inva-
lidity of the Texas habitual offender statute - which had previ-
ously been found constitutional14 - but rather upon the argu-
ment that the statute as applied to him111 violated the eighth 
amendment because the sentence was grossly disproportionate 
to his crime. 16 
The Supreme Court, affirming the lower courts, 17 rejected 
Rummel's contentions, finding the eighth amendment propor-
worth of goods and was sentenced to three years in the state penitentiary. Five years 
later, he was sentenced to four years in prison for passing a forged check for $28.36. 
Rummel was found guilty a third time in 1973, for the felony of obtaining $120.75 by 
false pretenses. 445 U.S. at 265-66. Ironically, Rummel was convicted of a fourth felony 
concurrently with being sentenced to life imprisonment under the provisions of the 
Texas habitual offender statute. See Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 659 (5th Cir. 
1978), aff'd, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
11. Subsequent to Rummel's felony conviction for theft by false pretext, Texas re-
classified the offense as a misdemeanor. See 'I'Ex. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(d)(3) (Supp. 
1980); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 295 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
12. The statute provided: "Whoever shall have been three times convicted of a felony 
less than capital shall on such third conviction be imprisoned for life in the peniten-
tiary." TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 63 (Vernon 1962) (current version at 'I'Ex. PENAL 
CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974)). For a general discussion of recidivist stat-
utes, see Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting Increased Sentences for 
Habitual or Dangerous Criminals, 89 HARV. L. REv. 356 (1975). 
13. See Rummel v. State, 509 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). 
14. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). 
15. The Supreme Court has held that a facially valid statute may be violative of the 
Constitution when applied in a particular case. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 
U.S. 229 (1963) (state statute prohibiting breach of the peace violated the first amend-
ment when invoked against participants in a demonstration). 
Appellate courts occasionally have overturned statutorily permissible sentences on the 
basis of an abuse of discretion by the sentencing judge. See, e.g., Woosley v. United 
States, 478 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1973) (vacating as an abuse of discretion a five-year sen-
tence imposed for refusing induction into the military service). Rummel, however, could 
not allege an abuse of discretion by the sentencing judge, because the life sentence was 
mandated by statute. 
16. Rummel was not sentenced to life imprisonment for obtaining money by false 
pretenses; under Texas law, the maximum penalty for that offense was 10 years impris-
onment. TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. art. 1421 (repealed 1973), reprinted in 'I'Ex. PENAL CODE 
ANN. app. (Vernon 1974). Rather, the life sentence stemmed from the provisions of the 
Texas habitual offender statute. See supra note 12. 
17. The federal district court had denied Rummel's petition for habeas relief without 
holding a hearing, but was reversed by a divided circuit court panel. Rummel v. Estelle, 
568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reheard 
Rummel's case en bane and affirmed the district court's denial of relief. Rummel v. Es-
telle, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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tionality principle18 inapplicable to the punishment Texas had 
imposed.19 The Court thereby had established a broad-based 
principle. Decisions regarding lengths of felony prison sentences 
would be entrusted to the discretion of the legislature,10 with the 
exception of "exceedingly rare" cases11 such as the imposition of 
a life sentence for the felony of overtime parking21 - which the 
Court acknowledged but made no attempt to define.13 
The, Court's conclusion that it would eschew proportionality 
review of prison terms imposed on felons stemmed from two dis-
tinct propositions. First, the Court did not find precedential 
support for Rummel's position that eighth amendment propor-
tionality principles were meant to apply to the length of prison 
sentences. 14 Second, the Court reasoned that assessing the pro-
18. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. 
19. The Court split 5-4. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, joined by 
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Blackmun. Justice Stewart also 
filed a concurring opinion. Justice Powell, dissenting, was joined by Justices Brennan, 
Marshall, ·and Stevens. 
20. See 445 U.S. at 274 ("[O]ne could argue without fear of contradiction by any 
decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies 
. . . the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative 
prerogative."). 
21. See Hutto v. Davis, 102 S. Ct. 703, 705 (1982) (per curiam) ("Rummel stands for 
the proposition that 'successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences' 
should be 'exceedingly rare'.") (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272). In several cases de-
cided before Davis, state and lower federal courts had adopted a similar view of Rum-
mel's meaning. See, e.g., Britton v. Rogers, 631 F.2d 572, 578 (8th Cir. 1980) (length of a 
felony prison sentence reviewable only on "extreme facts"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 
(1981); accord Hayes v. Bordenkircher, 621 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1980); State v. Smith, 275 
S.C. 164, 268 S.E.2d 276 ,(1980). Other courts, when faced with a statute mandating a 
particular punishment, have found Rummel to dictate that any deviation from the statu-
tory penalty is a matter for the legislature. See Comstock v. State, 406 N.E.2d 1164 (Ind. 
1980) (recidivist statute); State v. Jones, 298 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 1980) (statute governing 
consecutive sentences). 
22. 445 U.S. at 274 n.11. 
23. Thus, it is impossible to predict how the Court will react to particular cases that 
might be considered within the "exceedingly rare" category. Indeed, Hutto v. Davis, 102 
S. Ct. 703 (1982) (per curiam), the first Supreme Court case decided under Rummel, 
provides no insight into this problem; as the dissent observed, the Court made no at-
tempt to analyze why the defendant's case was not "exceedingly rare." Id. at 710 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices, however, argued that three features placed 
the case in that category. Defendant Davis had been convicted and sentenced to two 
consecutive 20-year terms for possession with intent to distribute and distribution of 
marijuana, the evidence consisting of less than nine ounces of marijuana found in his 
home. The dissent found Davis' situation "exceedingly rare" because his sentence was 
"in cruel and painful excess of the punishments imposed by the Virginia courts" for 
similar offenses. Id. at 710-11. Moreover, the prosecutor conceded that Davis's sentence 
"represent[ed] a 'grave disparity in sentencing' and that the continued incarceration of 
Davis '[was] grossly unjust'." Id. at 711. Finally, in 1979, six years after Davis's convic-
tion, the Virginia legislature reduced the maximum sentence with respect to each of Da-
vis's offenses from _40 years to 10 years. Id. 
24. 445 U.S. at 2'12-77. 
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portionality of prison terms was fraught with such difficulties -
because too subjective or too complex211 or too much an interfer-
ence with state autonomy118 - as to counsel against judicial re-
view of decisions essentially within the legislative prerogative. 
Yet these propositions appear flawed upon closer study; detailed 
examination of the two basic strands of the Court's analysis in 
Rummel, to which this Note now turns, reveals the flaws of the 
decision and suggests the continued viability of proportionality 
review of felony prison sentences. 
II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT APPLYING PROPORTIONALITY 
STANDARDS 
A. Challenges to Sentence Length - Weems v. United 
States 
In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court entertained 
eighth amendment challenges only in death penalty cases. 27 In 
Weems v. United States,18 however, the Court for the first time 
applied eighth amendment analysis to a non-capital case. In 
Weems, the defendant had been convicted in the Philippines29 
of falsifying a public document. so The mandatory punishment 
under Philippine law, cadena temporal, involved a composite of 
25. Id. at 279-81. 
26. Id. at 282-84. 
27. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) (finding execution by public 
shooting to be constitutional). '.!'he nineteenth century cases focused not upon the consti-
tutionality of the death penalty itself, but rather upon the legality of the execution 
method. During this period, the Court had barred only torture or other barbarous penal-
ties under the eighth amendment. See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) 
("Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punish-
ment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. 
It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere ex-
tinguishment of life."). For the view that the English roots of the eighth amendment 
indicate a greater concern for excessive rather than barbarous punishments, see Gra-
nucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 839 (1969). 
28. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The historical background of Weems is discussed extensively 
in Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical 
Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 783 (1975). 
29. At the time, the Philippines was a United States territory and thus came within 
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
30. The offense embraced any entry of false information in a public record, "though 
there be no one injured, though there be no fraud or purpose of it, no gain or desire of 
it." 217 U.S. at 365. 
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penalties. Confinement was for a minimum of twelve years, dur-
ing which the prisoner would be chained and required to do 
hard labor. In addition, a variety of accessory penalties were im-
posed: the prisoner lost all marital, parental, and property rights 
during confinement, and remained under surveillance of a crimi-
nal magistrate for life. 81 The Supreme Court agreed with the de-
fendant's argument that imposition of cadena temporal would 
be grossly disproportionate to the offense of falsifying a public 
document and declared the sentence unconstitutional as a viola-
tion of the eighth amendment. 81 
Rummel attempted to draw upon Weems as support for his 
contention that a prison sentence could be found violative of the 
eighth amendment proportionality principle, arguing that ca-
dena temporal had been found unconstitutional in part because 
the length of the prison term alone was excessive. 88 In effect, 
Rummel depicted Weems as establishing that a disproportion-
ately long prison sentence - twelve years confinement for the 
falsification of a document - could itself, without more, consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment. 
The Rummel majority rejected this reading, however, observ-
ing that Weems could not "be applied without regard to its pe-
culiar facts."84 In the Court's view, Weems held merely that the 
prison term and accessory penalties considered in combination 
- not separately - imposed cruel and unusual punishment. 85 
31. Id. at 364-66. 
32. Id. at 377-78. 
33. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 273 ("Rummel argues that the length of Weems' imprison-
ment was, by itaelf, a basis for the Court's decision"). 
34. These "peculiar facts" were "the triviality of the charged offense, the impressive 
length of the minimum term of imprisonment, and the extraordinary nature of the 'ac-
cessories' included within the punishment of cadena temporal." Id. at 274. 
By thus restricting Weems to its facts, the Court had departed from a series of deci-
sions construing Weems as support for the general proposition that punishment would 
be reviewed under eighth amendment proportionality principles. See, e.g., Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 393 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[Weems] is generally re-
garded as holding that a punishment may be excessively cruel within the meaning of the 
Eighth Amendment because it is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime 
.... "); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584, 592 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97, 103 n.7 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). 
35. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 273 (Weems "consistently referred jointly to the length of 
imprisonment and its 'accessories' or 'accompaniments'."). 
To buttress its point that Weems _had considered the prison term and accessory pun-
ishments in tandem, the Rummel majority observed that the Weems Court had expressly 
rejected the argument that "the provision for imprisonment in the Philippine Code is 
separable from the accessory punishment, and that the latter may be declared illegal, 
leaving the former to have application." 445 U.S. at 273-74 (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 
381-82). But it does not necessarily follow that the Weems Court did not consider the 
WINTER 1982] Salvaging Proportionate Sentencing 291 
Rummel thus identified the accessories as essential to the consti-
tutional defect in cadena temporal," concluding that Weems 
had not found the prison sentence alone to be an eighth amend-
ment violation. 87 
This reading of Weems, however, seems far too narrow,18 and 
disregards clear language to the contrary. In striking down the 
statute imposing cadena temporal for falsification of public doc-
uments, the Weems Court found the penalty to be "cruel in its 
excess of imprisonment and that which follows and accompanies 
imprisonment."89 In this passage, therefore, the Court con-
demned cadena temporal because it found the penalty's compo-
nent elements - separately stated - to constitute cruel and un-
usual punishment. Furthermore, the Court observed that the 
statute's "punishments come under the condemnation of the bill 
of rights, both on account of their degree and kind. "'0 The refer-
combined punishments of cadena temporal individually, merely because it recognized 
that Philippine law "unites the penaltiea of cadena temporal." The Court might well 
have considered, and seemingly did consider, the elements of cadena temporal sepa-
rately for purposes of eighth amendment analysis, even though recognizing it had no 
power to fashion a remedy for the constitutional violation that distinguished the acces-
sory penalties from the punishment. If the Court, in disposing of the case, had separated 
the elements of cadena temporal, it would have abridged the manifeat intent of the Phil-
ippine legislature, which had mandated both the acceasory sanctions and the prison term 
as punishment for Weems's offense. This legislative intent, however, had no bearing on 
whether the Court approached the elements of codena temporal as analytically distinct 
punishments. The Weems Court simply found itself powerleas to fashion a criminal pen-
alty - such as imprisonment alone - unauthorized by the statute. See Weems, 217 U.S. 
at 381-82 (" '(T]he general rule [is] that a judgment rendered by a court in a criminal 
case must conform strictly to the statute, and that any variation from its provisions, 
either in the character or the extent of punishment inflicted, renders the judgment abso-
lutely void .... ' ") (quoting /n re Graham, 138 U.S. 461, 462 (1891)). On this theory, 
therefore, the Court, when confronted with an unconstitutional composite punishment, 
had no alternative but to hold the entire penalty unconstitutional, rather than merely 
one component. 
36. See 445 U.S. at 274. 
37. Id. at 273 ("Although Rummel arguea that the length of Weems' imprisonment 
was, by itself, a basis for the Court's decision, the Court's opinion doea not support such 
a simple conclusion."). 
38. The Rummel majority is not alone, though, in viewing Weems as based upon a 
combination of punishments. See Packer, Makin/I the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 
HARV. L. R.Ev. 1071, 1075 (1964) ("it was the combination of an eir:ceasive but conven-
tional mode of punishment with a good deal of laid-on unpleasantness offensive for its 
novelty as well as its severity that supported the characterization of Weems' punishment 
as cruel and unusual"). But see 38 WASH. & LBB L. Rsv. 243, 251 (1981) ("the [Weems] 
Court recognized that length of punishment alone can constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment"). 
39. 217 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added). The Court has never directly decided whether 
"unusual" is distinct from "cruel" for eighth amendment purposes. See Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238, 331 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); Trop v. Dullea, 356 U.S. 86, 100 
n.32 (1958). 
40. 217 U.S. at 377. 
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ence to plural "punishments" strongly indicates that the Court 
considered the constitutionality of the individual elements of 
cadena temporal and found each constituent punishment - in-
cluding the excessively harsh prison sentence - to be violative 
of the eighth amendment. The Rummel majority, therefore, mis-
read Weems,41 which indeed represents good precedent for the 
proposition Rummel sought to establish: a prison sentence 
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense violates 
the eighth amendment. 42 
B. Proportionality and the Death Penalty Cases 
Three major death penalty cases of the 1970's48 firmly estab-
41. Rummel also ignored Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), which suggested that 
the length of incarceration may offend the Constitution. Regarding a prisoner's confine-
ment in isolation, the Hutto Court commented: "[T]he length of confinement cannot be 
ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional standards. A filthy, 
overcrowded cell and a diet of 'gruel' might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably 
cruel for weeks or months." Id. at 686-87. 
42. Additional language in Weems provides further support for the conclusion that 
the Court ruled on the constitutionality of the prison sentence alone. For instance, the 
issue raised by the defendant on appeal related solely to whether 15 years imprisonment 
was cruel and unusual punishment for falsifying a public record. 217 U.S. at 362. Fur-
thermore, the Court, in its review of eighth amendment case law, cited McDonald v. 
Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322 (1899), which recognized that a disproportionately long 
prison sentence might violate the Constitution, 217 U.S. at 368, and noted Justice Field's 
dissent in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892), in which he remarked that the 
eighth amendment prohibited "all punishments which by their excessive length or sever-
ity are greatly disproportionate to the offences charged." See also Hart v. Coiner, 483 
F.2d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1973) ("In Weems, the Court noticed, with apparent approval, 
that the highest state court of Massachusetts had previously conceded the possibility 
that 'punishment in the state prison for a long term of years might be so disproportion-
ate to the offense as to constitute a cruel and unusual punishment'.") (quoting Weems, 
217 U.S. at 368), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974). 
43. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See generally Radin, supra 
note 4. 
In Furman, with each Justice filing a separate opinion, the Court struck down Georgia 
and Texas death penalty statutes as violative of the eighth amendment. Several of the 
Justices focused upon the death penalty as administered in concluding that these stat-
utes inflicted cruel and unusual punishment: Justice Douglas felt the death penalty was 
applied discriminatorily against a specific class of people; Justice Stewart found that the 
penalty was administered so infrequently as to be "capricious"; and Justice White rea-
soned that the infrequency of executions made the death penalty ineffective in deterring 
crime. In contrast, Justices Marshall and Brennan found the death penalty to be uncon-
stitutional per se. In the view of Justice Marshall, the death penalty was unnecessarily 
cruel because its admittedly legitimate ends could be achieved by less severe sanctions. 
Justice Brennan - in addition to voicing the concerns of inconsistent administration 
and the availability of less drastic alternatives to achieve the same objective - charac-
terized the death penalty as not comporting with human dignity, because he found exe-
cution so severe as to degrade the prisoner. 
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lished that the eighth amendment prohibits penalties grossly 
disproportionate to the severity of the crime."' In addition to 
Weems, Rummel relied on the death penalty cases to show that 
the Court could find the prison term imposed upon him uncon-
stitutional because disproportionate to his crime.n For two rea-
sons, however, the Court refused to extend these precedents to 
eighth amendment attacks on sentence length. 
1. Distinguishing the death penalty from imprisonment-
The Court first found the principles announced in the death 
penalty cases to be of "limited assistance" to Rummel because 
"a sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of impris-
onment, no matter how long . . . . "'8 The majority relied upon 
the distinctions between the death penalty and imprisonment 
enunciated in Furman v. Georgia,., where Justice Stewart said 
that death constituted a "unique" penalty because it (1) is irrev-
ocable, (2) necessarily rejects rehabilitation of the convict as a 
basic goal of criminal justice, and (3) renounces all that is em-
bodied in society's concept of humanity.'8 
The Court's analysis, however was unresponsive to the ques-
In Gregg, the Court upheld the death penalty for murder. Justices Stewart, Powell, 
and Stevens concluded that, because at least 35 states had reenacted the death penalty 
after Furman, capital punishment should be considered neither excessively cruel nor dis-
proportionate punishment in all circumstances, and should be recognized as serving valid 
penological purposes. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn-
quist, found that the Georgia statute met the Furman test because it was not adminis-
tered in a discriminatory, standardless, or rare fashion. Justice Blackmun concurred in 
the judgment without opinion, while Justices Brennan and Marshall retained their views 
expressed in Furman. 
The Court in Coker considered the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty for 
the rape of an adult woman. Justice White, joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and 
Stevens, found the death penalty grossly disproportionate for the crime of rape, in viola-
tion of the eighth amendment. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the judg-
ment, citing their positions in Gregg that the death penalty constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishment in all circumstances. Justice Powell agreed that the death penalty 
would be disproportionate to the crime of rape where, as in Coker, there was no excessive 
brutality or lasting harm to the victim, but disagreed with the plurality that the death 
penalty would always be unconstitutional when im~ed for the crime of raping an adult 
woman. 
44. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("Under Gregg, 
a punishment is 'excessive' and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribu-
tion to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless 
and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the 
severity of the crime."). 
45. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272 ("Rummel cites these ... opinions dealing with 
capital punishment as compelling the conclusion that bis sentence is disproportionate to 
bis offenses."). 
46. Id. 
47. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
48. Id. at 306 (Stewart J., concurring). 
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tion presented by Rummel. Although Justice Stewart had in-
deed articulated salient features of the death penalty, for the 
purposes of eighth amendment proportionality analysis these 
features fail to distinguish the capital cases from cases involving 
excessive prison sentences. First, Furman identified irrevocabil-
ity as a factor making the death penalty unique. But, in fact, 
both the death penalty and a prison sentence are, in the relevant 
sense of the term, "irrevocable." The death penalty is irrevoca-
ble not because once pronounced it can never be rescinded; the 
sentence can be commuted to life imprisonment, for example, 
before the day of execution. Rather, the death penalty is irrevo-
cable because once carried out it cannot be voided. A prison sen-
tence is similarly irrevocable: a twenty-year sentence may be 
shortened by parole, for instance, before being fully served. Once 
the prisoner has served the term, however, the state can neither 
shorten the sentence nor return the years of imprisonment. 
Therefore, a prison sentence already served is fully as "irrevoca-
ble" as a death warrant already executed. 
Justice Stewart in Furman identified a second "unique" ele-
ment of the death penalty: it alone denies rehabilitation as an 
objective of the criminal justice system. Yet this distinction, 
while correct, lacks constitutional significance. Whether capital 
punishment serves a rehabilitative purpose has never been dis-
positive of the eighth amendment issue. For example, the death 
penalty, never rehabilitative, has been upheld as a constitutional 
punishment for murder,49 but cruel and unusual punishment 
when imposed on a rapist.50 Indeed, the Constitution does not 
require that a criminal penalty have a particular penological 
goal, rehabilitative or otherwise. While the Constitution requires 
punishment to have some penological objective,111 rehabilitation 
is only one of several goals that would satisfy this requirement. 111 
On this basis, therefore, imprisonment and the death penalty 
cannot be distinguished; both serve valid, constitutional peno-
logical goals. 
Finally, the third Furman factor relied upon by the Court in 
Rummel to distinguish the death penalty cases was that only 
capital punishment renounces the prisoner's humanity. Upon 
49. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
50. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
51. See id. at 592. This is not the only constitutional requirement; the eighth amend-
ment also forbids penalties grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Id. 
52. The purposes of criminal sanction can be categorized as prevention, restraint, re-
habilitation, education, and retribution. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON THE 
CRIMINAL LAW § 5 (1972). 
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closer examination, however, this factor appears to be a hollow 
means upon which to draw a distinction; in various decisions, a 
majority of the Justices seemingly have held that the death pen-
alty per se does not deny the condemned person's humanity. 113 
Thus, the third factor identified by the Rummel Court for differ-
entiating capital punishment from imprisonment simply cannot 
withstand scrutiny. 
53. Justice Stewart seemingly derived the notion that the death penalty renounces 
humanity from Justice Brennan's concurrence in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972). Justice Stewart's concurrence in Furman, however, did not rely upon the argu-
ment regarding renunciation of humanity; he classified this factor as being one of the 
reasons why "at least two of [his] Brothers ... concluded that the infliction of the death 
penalty is constitutionally impermissible in all circumstances," id. at 306, and then pro-
ceeded to concur on the basis that the death penalty had been "wantonly . . . and freak-
ishly imposed," id. at 310. 
For Justice Brennan, the eighth amendment commands fundamentally that punish-
ment "comport with human dignity." Id. at 270. This means, in part, that the punish-
ment must not be so severe that it "reflect[s] the attitude that the person punished is 
not entitled to recognition as a fellow human being." Id. at 273; cf. id. at 272-73 ("The 
true significance of [constitutionally prohibited barbaric] punishments is that they treat 
members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded."). 
A punishment's denial of the prisoner's humanity, therefore may result solely from its 
severity. Justice Brennan found that "[d]eath is today an unusually severe punishment, 
severe in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity." Id. at 287. Because of the severity 
of capital punishment, he concluded, "the deliberate extinguishment of .human life by 
the State is uniquely degrading to human dignity." Id. at 291; see also id. at 290 ("The 
calculated killing of a human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of 
the executed person's humanity."). 
Several death penalty cases indicate, however, that at least five Justices would disagree 
with Justice Brennan's conclusion that the severity of the penalty renders capital pun-
ishment a denial of the prisoner's humanity. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), 
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens held that the death penalty is not excessively se-
vere. They explicitly recognized that the eighth amendment requires that a "penalty . . . 
must accord with 'the dignity of a man'," id. at 173, while agreeing that the death pen-
alty is uniquely severe, id. at 187. Nevertheless, they refused to conclude that capital 
punishment is impermissible in all circumstances, noting instead that "[i]t is an extreme 
sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes." Id. By implication, therefore, Justices 
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens disagreed with Justice Brennan that the severity of the 
death penalty alone denies the humanity or dignity of the condemned person. 
Two other Justices have reached a similar conclusion. Relying on his dissent in Rob-
erts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (finding a mandatory death penalty statute to be 
cruel and unusual punishment), Justice White concurred in Gregg, reasoning that the 
death penalty is not always unconstitutional. See 428 U.S. at 226. In his Roberts dissent, 
in which Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined, Justice 
White concluded that the death penalty could not always be characterized as being so 
excessively severe as to violate the Constitution. 428 U.S. at 353. Although the Roberts 
dissent was not founded on the dignity-of-man theory, Justices White and Blackmun 
appeared to embrace this theory in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1977) (opin-
ion of White, J.), which found the death penalty unconstitutional as an excessive punish-
ment for the rape of an adult woman. In light of Coker, these two Roberts dissenters 
seemingly believe that the death penalty is not so inherently severe as to deny the con-
demned person's dignity. Consequently, at least five Justices would disagree with Justice 
Brennan that the death penalty inherently renounces the prisoner's humanity. 
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2. Drawing a "bright line" for proportionality analysis- Ref-
erence to the features compiled by Justice Stewart in Furman, 
therefore, does not provide a satisfactory basis for distinguishing 
the application of proportionality principles in the death penalty 
cases from cases seeking judicial review of excessively harsh 
prison sentences. The Rummel Court, however, alluded to a fur-
ther argument that could differentiate capital punishment cases 
from those involving imprisonment. As the Court phrased it, a 
"bright line" can be drawn between the death penalty and all 
other punishments;H no similarly sharp distinction exists be-
tween varying terms of imprisonment. The Court made clear its 
desire to avoid a "slippery slope" along which principled lines 
could not be drawn,u thus limiting itself to reviewing the pro-
portionality of punishment only in an area seemingly susceptible 
of clear constitutional distinction.118 The Court perceived at-
tempts by the judiciary to review prison sentences as impermis-
sible, or at least ill-advised, "intrusion[s] into the basic line-
drawing process that is preeminently the province of the legisla-
ture .... "117 
This argument may be attacked on two fronts. First, although 
the death penalty differs in kind from other punishments - be-
cause it alone involves loss of life - this is irrelevant for pur-
poses of applying the proportionality principle. Eighth amend-
ment proportionality analysis compares the severity of pun-
ishment and crime. Thus, the capital cases involving eighth 
amendment challenges that relied on the proportionality princi-
ple118 assessed the severity of the penalty - rather than the kind 
of punishment - in relation to the offense involved. In Coker v. 
Georgia,119 for example, the Court held in effect that death was 
too severe a punishment for the rape of an adult woman. For 
purposes of applying the proportionality principle, therefore, the 
death penalty differs from other punishments only in its degree 
of severity; less severe punishments, such as prison sentences, 
need not be excluded from consideration. 
Second, the line-drawing problem inherent in constitutional 
54. See 445 U.S. at 275. 
55. For a discussion of "slippery slope" considerations, see Schwartz, Eighth Amend-
ment Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 378, 417-19 (1980). 
56. But see supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text (arguing that no distinction 
exists, for eighth amendment proportionality purposes, between the death penalty and 
lesser criminal sanctions). 
57. 445 U.S. at 275. 
58. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
59. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
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review of prison terms - but not the death penalty - does not 
justify excluding imprisonment from proportionality considera-
tion. Although arbitrary distinctions between differing terms of 
years may be the inevitable result of judicial review of prison 
sentences, the Court nonetheless can draw lines which afford 
some measure of eighth amendment protection for felons pun-
ished by imprisonment. An analogy can be drawn concerning the 
right to jury trial,60 where the Supreme Court recognized the 
need to draw arguably arbitrary lines. Having previously upheld 
a criminal conviction returned by a unanimous six-member 
jury,61 the Court refused to sustain a unanimous five-member 
jury conviction, even though a majority admitted it could not 
discern a clear distinction between five- and six-person juries.62 
Clearly, a refusal to draw an arbitrary line between varying jury 
sizes could lead to erosion of the right to jury trial. Similarly, the 
Court should not be deterred from distinguishing between con-
stitutional and unconstitutional terms of years - if the alterna-
tive is to remove all prison sentences from eighth amendment 
scrutiny. 
Moreover, even accepting the premise that an arbitrary consti-
tutional line between sentence lengths is unacceptable, the pro-
portionality principle need not be abandoned altogether as 
invariably producing arbitrary results.69 Although some propor-
tionality judgments may be arbitrary, this will not necessarily be 
true of all such judgments. For example, a court, upon consider-
ation of various factors,6" might find forty years imprisonment to 
be a punishment grossly disproportionate to the offense of steal-
ing a $100 coat. These same factors, however, may not tell the 
60. The sixth amendment provides in part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. 
CONST. amend. VI. 
61. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
62. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978). In Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 
(1979), the Court considered a state statute permitting conviction by a six-member jury 
on a 5-1 vote. The Court had previously upheld convictions by a unanimous six-member 
jury, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), and by a non-unanimous twelve-member 
jury, see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (finding convictions on 11-1 and 10-2 
jury votes constitutional). The Court in Burch held unconstitutional the non-unanimous 
vote of a six-member jury. Speaking for the Court, Justice Rehnquist noted that "lines 
must be drawn somewhere if the substance of the jury trial right is to be preserved." 441 
U.S. at 137. 
63. See 445 U.S. at 275-76 ("to recognize that the State of Texas could have impris-
oned Rummel for life if he had stolen $5,000, $50,000, or $500,000, rather than . . . 
$120.75 ... , is virtually to concede that the lines to be drawn are indeed 'subjective,' 
and therefore properly within the province· of legislatures, not courts"). 
64. Before Rummel was decided, the state and lower federal courts had identified 
several of these factors. See infra text accompanying notes 69-71. 
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court whether a one-year difference in sentences - between, for 
instance, nine and ten years - makes a constitutional differ-
ence. Faced with this decision, the court may find, arbitrarily, 
that a nine- but not a ten-year sentence is constitutionally per-
missible. Yet the holding that a forty-year term for the theft im-
posed cruel and unusual punishment would remain a principled 
decision, even if the court were forced into an arbitrary line on 
the more difficult case.611 The arbitrariness of some proportional-
ity decisions does not infect all others - and does not compel 
wholesale abandonment of the proportionality doctrine. 
Thus, the notion that the courts should engage in eighth 
amendment proportionality review of criminal sanctions appears 
equally applicable to the death penalty and to prison sentences. 
Indeed, nothing in the capital punishment cases suggested that 
the principles announced were not of general application;86 the 
precedent seemingly provided authority for the Court to engage 
in eighth amendment review of sentence length. 
Ill. THE PROPORTIONALITY TEST OF SENTENCE LENGTH 
Aside from the question of whether Rummel could muster 
precedential support for his position, the Court advanced a sec-
ond major objection to judicial review of prison terms,87 focusing 
on the flaws inherent in applying eighth amendment proportion-
65. The fears that proportionality review of prison sentences would deteriorate into a 
wholly arbitrary process may in fact be unfounded. Dissenting in Rummel, Justice Pow-
ell observed that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - the last 
bastion of proportionality oversight of sentence length - had managed workable stan-
dards for assessing whether prison terms violated the eighth amendment, without be-
coming hopelessly mired in indiscriminate linedrawing. See 445 U.S. at 304-06 (Powell, 
J., dissenting). 
66. The mode of analysis in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), is illustrative. The 
Court first isolated general principles of eighth amendment analysis and then applied 
these principles to the death penalty: 
In the discussion to this point we have sought to identify the principles and 
considerations that guide a court in addressing an Eighth Amendment claim. We 
now consider specifically whether the sentence of death for the crime of murder 
is a per se violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution. 
Id. at 176 (emphasis added). The Rummel dissent also noted that the "principle of dis-
proportionality has been acknowledged to apply to both capital and noncapital 
sentences." 445 U.S. at 293 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
67. The Rummel Court did not expressly address itself to the proportionality test per 
se. But the Court clearly responded to the arguments advanced by Rummel that were 
intended to show the disproportionality of his life prison sentence. See 445 U.S. at 274-
75, 279-81, 282-84; see also Hutto v. Davis, 102 S. Ct. 705 n.2 (1982) (per curiam) 
(describing Rummel as disapproving of each factor of the proportionality test). 
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ality principles to assess the constitutionality of specific sen-
tences. Before Rummel, eighth amendment challenges to felony 
prison terms, arguing that the punishment was grossly dispro-
portionate to the severity of the crime, had been considered fre-
quently68 and sustained occasionally in the state and lower fed-
eral courts. 69 These courts had refined the proportionality 
principle into a three-part test,70 assessing whether a prison 
term violated the eighth amendment by considering (1) the na-
ture and gravity of the offense, (2) a comparison of the punish-
ment imposed with penalties for other crimes in the jurisdiction, 
and (3) a comparison of the punishment imposed with penalties 
for the same crime in other jurisdictions. 71 Rummel argued that 
these factors demonstrated the disproportionality of his prison 
sentence. But the Court found the test an inappropriate vehicle 
for considering whether terms of imprisonment transgressed 
eighth amendment limits on punishment. The Court concluded 
that the test relied too heavily upon subjective considerations 
best left to the legislature,71 and that it entailed complex judg-
ments73 intruding heavily upon state autonomy in matters of 
68. See, e.g., United States v. Faleafine, 492 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1974) (50-year sentence 
for kidnapping does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); McDonald v. Arkan-
sas, 501 F.2d 385 (8th Cir.) (eighth amendment not violated by a 30-year sentence im-
posed for forcible rape), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1004 (1974); Yeager v. Estelle, 489 F.2d 
276 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (500-year prison term for murder did not inflict cruel 
and unusual punishment), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 908 (1974); Guerro v. Fitzpatrick, 436 
F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (three consecutive 9- to 10-year terms for the of-
fense of receiving stolen motor vehicles did not violate the eighth amendment); United 
States v. Collins, 432 F.2d 1136 (7th Cir. 1970) (8-year prison sentence for the unlawful 
transportation of stolen firearms was not cruel and unusual punishment), cert. denied, 
400 U.S. 1011 (1971); United States v. Overton, 359 F.2d 28 (4th Cir. 1966) (eighth 
amendment was not violated by a 3-month sentence imposed for the willful failure to file 
federal income tax returns); see also Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 335 (1970). 
69. See cases cited supra note 3. 
70. See generally Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 
983 (1974); White, Disproportionality and the Death Penalty: Death as Punishment for 
Rape, 38 U. PITT. L. REv. 145, 150-58 (1977); Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of 
Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1119 (1979). 
71. The test is intended to be cumulative, with each element checking the accuracy of 
the others. See Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 
983 (1974). 
72. 445 U.S. at 274-75. Ironically, courts had employed the proportionality test to 
minimize subjectivity in the judicial process. See, e.g., Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 
409 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 140 
(4th Cir. 1973) ("there are several objective factors which are useful in determining 
whether the sentence in this case is constitutionally disproportionate"), cert. denied, 415 
U.S. 983 (1974). One court has suggested that the proportionality test improves upon the 
"subjective evaluation which looks to the extent to which the conscience of the court is 
shocked by punishments imposed." People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 111, 332 N.E.2d 
338, 342, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 476, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950 (1975). 
73. 445 U.S. at 279-81. 
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criminal justice. 74 In fact, however, the Court's objections to the 
proportionality test are not persuasive; as the following analysis 
demonstrates, courts interpreting state constitutional prohibi-
tions on cruel and unusual punishment should not be dissuaded 
from applying proportionality analysis by the concerns advanced 
in Rummel. 
A. The Gravity of the Offense 
As a first proposition, a court considering whether a prison 
term imposes cruel and unusual punishment must assess the 
gravity of the offense; a harsh penalty for a relatively trivial of-
fense may suggest disproportionality. In their efforts to evaluate 
objectively the gravity of the offense at issue, some courts have 
considered whether the crime was violent or otherwise against 
the person 711 - in effect distinguishing the gravity of crimes by 
the presence of violence. Indeed, Rummel urged that his crimes 
were "petty" because none were against the person.76 The Court 
rejected this approach, finding violence to be inadequate as an 
indication of the gravity of an offense.77 For instance, noted the 
Court, a corporate officer accepting a bribe would commit a seri- · 
ous, albeit nonviolent, crime.78 
The Court properly criticized the approach of those courts 
employing violence as a proxy for the gravity of offenses. The 
proportionality test itself, however, remains intact; several 
courts have measured the gravity of a crime, not by reference to 
the violence involved, but by considering the degree of harm the 
criminal act causes society.79 Under this approach, the gravity of 
74. Id. at 282-84. 
75. See, e.g., Hall v. McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1976); Hart v. Coiner, 483 
F.2d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1973) ("In assessing the nature and gravity of an offense, courts 
have repeatedly emphasized the element of violence and danger to the person."), cert. 
denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974). 
76. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275. 
77. Id. at 275, 282 n.27. 
78. Id. at 275. 
79. See, e.g., People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 112, 332 N.E.2d 338, 342, 371 
N.Y.S.2d 471, 476 ("In assessing the gravity of a criminal offense, the primary considera-
tion is the harm it causes to society."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950 (1975); In re Lynch, 8 
Cal. 3d 410,431, 503 P.2d 921, 935, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 231 (1972) (the annoyance caused 
by indecent exposure "is not a sufficiently grave danger to society to warrant the heavy 
punishment of a life-maximum sentence"); see also Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2d 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979). 
Although these courts have not discussed the point, what constitutes "harm" to society 
may vary among crimes; for instance, the harm caused by passing a bad check differs 
from the harm caused by murder. The distinctions flow, of course, from the varied socie-
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an offense turns on the injury inflicted upon society, thus mini-
mizing judicial subjectivity. The assessment of the harm caused 
society involves a factual inquiry, at least to some extent, and a 
reviewing court may rely on empirical studies, where available, 
to determine the scope of the injury occasioned by the crime. 
One court, for example, utilized various government reports in 
assessing the harm to society engendered by narcotics sales. 80 
Another court, reviewing a one-year-to-life sentence for second-
offense indecent exposure, drew from clinical studies of the dam-
age· inflicted upon the victims of exhibitionist displays.81 Where 
such studies do not exist, the court could consider expert testi-
mony or other documentation regarding the extent of harm 
caused by a particular crime. Of course, if such evidence is lack-
ing or inconclusive, the court would be free to find, based upon 
the gravity of the offense, that the defendant has not been sub-
jected to an unconstitutionally disproportionate sentence. 
Although objective evidence can never precisely measure the 
gravity of various offenses, the court need not fix the crime's se-
riousness with precision. The proportionality principle prohibits 
only penalties grossly disproportionate to the crime. A court 
must only estimate the range of gravity within which the crime 
falls; vast differences between that range and the severity of the 
sentences imposed indicate gross disproportionality. In this lim-
ited inquiry, courts have sufficient guidance to ensure results not 
bottomed merely upon judges' subjective impressions. 
B. Intrajurisdictional Comparisons 
In addition to weighing the severity of punishment against the 
gravity of the offense, a court applying the proportionality test 
also will compare the sentence imposed on the defendant against 
the penalties levied for other crimes - particularly far more se-
rious crimes - in the jurisdiction.82 Gross disproportionality, in 
violation of the eighth amendment, will be suggested if these 
other crimes are subject to lesser sanctions than those imposed 
on the defendant. Thus, a court might conclude that a thirty-
tal interests threatened by these criminal acts. Passing a bad check impinges upon soci-
ety's interest in the security of private property, whereas murder threatens physical 
security. 
80. See People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d 338, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 950 (1975). 
81. See In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 821, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972). 
82. See, e.g., Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 142 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 
983 (1974). 
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year sentence for the possession and sale of a small amount of 
marijuana is grossly disproportionate, in part because armed 
robbery and forcible rape are punished by a maximum seven-
year term in the same jurisdiction. 88 
This portion of the proportionality test assumes a reviewing 
court's competence to choose among the severity of offenses 
within the jurisdiction. Unless a court can adjudge that rape is 
more serious than the sale of marijuana, for instance, it will be 
unable to rely upon the maximum term for rapists in finding 
that a thirty-year sentence inflicts cruel and unusual punish-
ment upon the seller of marijuana. In Rummel, however, the 
Court suggested that such distinctions between the severity 
of crimes would necessarily be flawed because lacking in 
objectivity.84 
The Court identified two rationales supporting this thesis. 
First, it found that comparing the gravity of crimes is an "inher-
ently speculative" task.H Each crime, the Court reasoned, 
threatens a "unique" group of social values defined by the legis-
lature and not susceptible of being grouped with other of-
fenses. 88 With no shared underlying values or interests, there ex-
ists no basis for comparing the gravity of any two crimes. 
Although different crimes indeed may threaten different social 
interests, the position that each crime is "unique" and not com-
parable with others seems extreme. If each crime were truly 
unique, the gravities of murder and assault, for example, could 
not be compared: a court could not assert that murder is more 
serious than assault. This result, however, runs contrary both 
to common sense and to decisions such as Coker v. Georgia,87 
where four Justices found murder to be a more serious offense 
than rape.88 Thus, the premise that crimes are entirely unique 
83. See, e.g., Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.), vacated, 423 U.S. 993 (1975). 
84. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275. 
85. Id. at 282 n.27. 
86. Id. 
87. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
88. See id. at 598 (rape is not as serious as murder because "rape by definition does 
not include the death of or even the serious injury to another person"). For a criticism of 
the Court's argument, see Note, Coker v. Georgia: Disproportionate Punishment and the 
Death Penalty for Rape, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 1714, 1719-20 (1978). 
Similarly, other courts have found the eighth amendment to be violated by the imposi-
tion of a greater punishment upon a lesser included offense of the same sort. See Roberts 
v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1976) (where maximum penalty for assault with intent 
to kill is 15 years, a prison sentence of 20 years for each count of assault inflicts cruel 
and unusual punishment), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 973 (1977); Cannon v. State, 203 Or. 
629, 281 P.2d 233 (1955) (life imprisonment for assault with intent to commit rape vio-
lates the eighth amendment, where the maximum penalty for rape is 20 years). 
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and incomparable must be rejected. 
The Rummel Court's second, related argument against com-
paring the punishments for other crimes within a particular ju-
risdiction is open to similar objections. The Court reasoned that 
intrajurisdictional comparisons were suspect because "rational 
people could disagree as to which criminal merits harsher pun-
ishment."89 Indeed, this may be true to some extent: rational 
people could disagree concerning whether an embezzler of bank 
funds merits harsher punishment than an armed robber making 
off with a smaller amount of money90 - but no rational person 
would maintain that murder constitutes a less serious offense 
than assault. Again, the Court's argument proves too much. 
Nonetheless, the Court's second objection to intrajurisdic-
tional comparisons does suggest a genuine problem with this as-
pect of the proportionality test. A judicial determination of the 
relative severity of two crimes may be rationally controvertible 
because it relies more on the judge's personal values and experi-
ence than on recognized principle. Such "subjective" determina-
tions would be most likely if a court were to engage in subtle 
comparisons between offenses; for instance, a judge who decides 
that assault with intent to kill is more serious than kidnapping 
makes a subtle and suspiciously subjective judgment. A review-
ing court, therefore, when administering the second element of 
the proportionality test, must refrain from making overly refined 
determinations regarding the relative severity of compared 
offenses. 
Rummel itself provides a useful standard for determining ac-
ceptable judgments of the relative gravity of offenses. A judicial 
judgment of the gravity of an offense relative to other crimes 
punished in the jurisdiction is acceptable only if rational people 
would not dispute that judgment. Such a restriction upon courts 
applying proportionality analysis would prevent subtle, over-
drawn distinctions between constitutionally acceptable levels of 
punishment, while enabling eighth amendment review of prison 
sentences within the realm of judicial competency. 
C. Interjurisdictional Comparisons 
The third element of the proportionality test calls for a re-
viewing court to compare the sentence at issue with the penal-
ties imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Contem-
89. 445 U.S.· at 282 n.27. 
90. See id. 
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porary attitudes - reflected by the sentencing patterns among 
the states91 - regarding the proper level of punishment thus in-
form the constitutional judgment.92 A challenged penalty far in 
excess of nationwide practices, therefore, would conflict with 
contemporary values, suggesting disproportionate punishment in 
violation of the eighth amendment. 
The Rummel Court expressed concern that such comparisons 
would unduly interfere with state autonomy in the administra-
tion of criminal justice. The Court reasoned that to infer consti-
tutional disproportionality in part from interjurisdictional com-
parisons would presume "a constitutionally imposed uniformity" 
among the states.98 This "uniformity," the Court posited, would 
prevent any state from punishing particular crimes more se-
verely than other states - thereby inducing restraints on state 
policies that would be "inimical to traditional notions of 
federalism. "94 
The Court, however, misunderstands the constitutional signifi-
cance of a disparity between a particular prison sentence and 
prevailing practice among the states. Not every such disparity 
suggests disproportionality;911 the Constitution prohibits only 
grossly disproportionate penalties, so that only punishment far 
91. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976) ("The most marked indica-
tion of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative response 
to Furman."). 
The Rummel majority, however, questioned a court's competence to define adequately 
the relevant sentencing pattern. The Court noted several "complexities confronting any 
court that would attempt [an interjurisdictional] comparison," although these "complex-
ities" were not "inherent flaws" in the interjurisdictional analysis. 445 U.S. at 281. For a 
discussion of this argument, see infra notes 98-107 and accompanying text. 
92. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349, 378 (1910). 
93. 445 U.S. at 282. 
94. Id. The Court, however, has found "national practice" to be a suitable objective 
measure of at least one other constitutional standard. In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 
66 (1970) (plurality opinion), the Court held that a defendant charged with a crime pun-
ishable by more than six months imprisonment had a sixth amendment right to jury 
trial. The Court found that every court except those of New York City, where the defen-
dant was convicted, permitted a jury trial on charges of crimes punishable by sentences 
longer than six months. Speaking for the plurality, Justice White remarked that the 
"near uniform judgment of the Nation" was an "objective criterion by which a line could 
. . . be drawn" around offenses that would be regarded as sufficient to invoke the defen-
dant's right to jury trial. Id. at 72-73. 
95. A particular sentence should withstand scrutiny so long as at least a significant 
number of the states impose equivalent or more severe punishment for the same crime. 
See Hall v. McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1976) (10- to 20-year sentence for 
nonforcible rape of a 13-year-old female equivalent to or less than the penalties imposed 
by 16 states and District of Columbia for the same crime; sentence held constitutional 
under the eighth amendment). 
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exceeding nationwide ~orms96 would run afoul of the eighth 
amendment. Consequently, the interjurisdictional comparison 
• permits a wide diversity of approaches among the states, recog-
nizing the states' considerable - but not unlimited - freedom 
to punish felons according to their own standards. 97 
In addition to its desire to avoid intrusions upon state func-
tions, the Rummel Court identified several practical "complexi-
ties" presented by interjurisdictional analysis. First, the Court 
expressed misgivings about how to treat statutes in other states 
that had provisions similar but not identical to the statute under 
which the defendant was sentenced. 98 For example, Rummel had 
been prosecuted under a Texas recidivism statute mandating a 
life sentence for anyone convicted of three felonies. The Court 
noted, however, that other states impose a mandatory sentence 
upon recidivists after four rather than three felony convictions, 
or require the defendant to have committed at least one "vio-
lent" felony, or entrust the decision to the judge or jury whether 
to impose a life sentence upon the recidivist.99 The Court con-
96. It is difficult to define precisely when a penalty greatly exceeds nationwide prac-
tice. Diversity in sentencing practices among the states is a justifiable result of our plu-
ralistic society. Nevertheless, where the national pattern is not a relatively continuous 
gradation from the less severe to the most severe penalty, a national trend will appear. 
Although courts should tolerate substantial diversity, they should hold disproportionate 
those practices that do not represent reasonably expected variations on the national 
trend. See, e.g., In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) 
(defendant's sentence of one-year-to-life for second offense of indecent exposure would 
have been imposed by only two other states, the remaining states punishing the crime 
with "a short jail sentence and/or a small fine"). 
97. One court has also argued that the severity of a punishment should match the 
magnitude of the state's problem with the crime - rather than the gravity of the crime 
itself. See Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091 
(1979). The penalties imposed by other states and interjurisdictional comparisons, conse-
quently, would have no significance: "If the punishment must fit the crime, the legisla-
ture must look at the crime as found in its own borders and the action of states faced 
with drug problems of lesser magnitude are of little importance." Id. at 415. 
This view, however, is inconsistent with the proportionality principle. The eighth 
amendment instructs that a penalty is unconstitutional if grossly disproportionate to the 
severity of the crime, not to the severity of the state's problem with the crime. Thus, a 
harsh penalty for a petty crime would be prohibited by the proportionality principle 
even if the incidence of the crime reached epidemic levels. Judge Oakes, for example, 
dissenting in Carmona, recognized that, besides the defendant's crime of drug traffick-
ing, "New York also has [possibly] more serious traffic in stolen securities and counter-
feit money and more income tax, nursing home and welfare fraud than other states, but 
if these facts were true they would not justify disproportionately higher sentences for 
those crimes." Id. at 424 (Oakes, J., dissenting). In the words of Justice Marshall, the 
high incidence of motor vehicle theft and larceny in New York "could not insulate Dra-
conian penalties for such offenses from constitutional challenge." Carmona v. Ward, 439 
U.S. 1091, 1102 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
98. See 445 U.S. at 279-80. 
99. Id. 
306 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 15:2 
eluded that it would be difficult "to evaluate the position of any 
particular recidivist scheme within [this] complex matrix."100 
Upon closer examination, however, the difficulty disappears. 
The constitutionally significant questions are whether and to 
what extent Rummel would have been treated more harshly by 
these alternative recidivist statutes. These questions, directed at 
the Court's illustrations, are answered easily. A statute requiring 
four felonies for mandatory life imprisonment would not have 
imposed that sentence upon a defendant who, like Rummel, had 
committed only three felonies. Nor would a statute requiring a 
"violent" felony have imposed such a sentence on Rummel, who 
committed only felonious property offenses. In contrast, the 
statute leaving sentencing decisions to the judge or jury is argua-
bly no less harsh than the Texas law, because it would expose 
the defendant to the same maximum penalty. The important 
point, though, is that differences between the Texas habitual of-
fender provisions and these other statutes could readily be per-
ceived. These differences might be "subtle rather than gross"101 
- and thus not indicative of disproportionality - but they cer-
tainly could be subjected to eighth amendment scrutiny. 
The Court noted a further complexity in comparing recidivism 
statutes: not all states offer a parole possibility.102 Unlike Texas, 
Mississippi, for instance, imposes a life sentence without parole 
upon the third felony conviction.108 Yet, the Court did not make 
clear how the need to distinguish between recidivism statutes 
having differing parole alternatives would "complicate" the in-
terjurisdictional analysis. Simply stated, the possibility for pa-
role would be another - perhaps major - factor in comparing 
the harshness of punishments among jurisdictions. 104 This would 
seemingly be a simple rather than complicated comparison.1011 
100. Id. at 280. 
101. Id. at 279. 
102. Id. at 280-81. 
103. Id. at 281. 
104. See Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 660 (5th Cir. 1978) (suggesting that the 
possibility for parole can mitigate the harshness of a prison sentence), aff'd, 445 U.S. 263 
(1980). For discussion regarding whether the likelihood of parole should be considered in 
eighth amendment proportionality analysis, see Schwartz, supra note 55, at 414-17; 19 
DuQ. L. REv. 167, 177 (1980); 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 525, 538 (1980); 38 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 243, 253 (1981). 
105. The only complication, in fact, arises from Rummel's vague pronouncements on 
the weight to be given a parole possibility in assessing the severity of a statutory sen-
tence. On the one hand, because there is no right to parole, the Court acknowledged that 
Rummel's life sentence, despite the possibility for parole, could not be considered 
"equivalent to a sentence of 12 years." 445 U.S. at 280. On the other hand, the Court did 
not treat Rummel's punishment as a sentence for life. See id. at 268, 281. The severity of 
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Finally, the Court identified the "variable" of "prosecutorial 
discretion" as making interjurisdictional comparisons even more 
difficult, pointing out that prosecutors often exercise discretion 
in eliminating truly "petty" offenders from the literal scope of 
an habitual offender statute. The flexibility induced by such dis-
cretion, however, should not complicate the analysis.108 The 
Court apparently assumed that most, if not all, recidivist 
schemes invest the prosecutor with discretion in invoking the 
statute.107 But for purposes of interjurisdictional analysis, the 
relevant inquiry should be into societal expectations, as embod-
ied in the criminal statutes, regarding the proper punishment for 
a given offense; prevailing community attitudes will be control-
ling, rather than the individual instance where a prosecutor 
might screen out a trivial case. 
CONCLUSION 
Judicial involvement in reviewing statutorily mandated crimi-
nal punishment reflects the recognition that legislatures will not 
always adhere to the limitations established by the eighth 
Rummel's sentence, therefore, must lie somewhere between 12 years and life. The Court, 
however, gave no guidance as to the strength of the parole factor in assessing the sen-
tence's severity. The majority provided no more guidance than to observe that a court 
"could hardly ignore the possibility that he [Rummel] will not actually be imprisoned for 
the rest of his life." Id. at 281. 
106. The Court's chief concern may have been that Rummel's "entire criminal re-
cord" would have been introduced in new proceedings if Rummel's life sentence were 
deemed unconstitutional. See id. at 281. Because the likely result would be the discovery 
of additional felony convictions, see supra note 10, the Court wondered "whether [the 
sentencing] court could then sentence Rummel to life imprisonment even though his 
recidivist status based on only three felonies had been held to be a 'cruel and unusual' 
punishment." Id. Thus, it could be argued that "the Court upheld the sentence at least 
in part for fear that if it did not, the recidivist statute for any number of felonies greater 
than three would have been rendered ineffectual." Comment, Rummel v. Estelle: Leav-
ing the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in Constitutional Limbo, 15 VAL. U.L. 
REV. 201, 225 (1980). This fear, however, appears unfounded. Rummel challenged the 
statute as applied to his three particular property offenses, 445 U.S. at 270-71; he did not 
dispute the state's authority to impose the life sentence for only three felonies, but for 
three specific felonious property offenses. Consequently, any holding striking down 
Rummel's punishment would have left the state courts free to impose the sanctions of 
the recidivist statute upon proof of three (or more) egregious felonies. If the Court had 
overturned Rummel's life sentence based upon the commission of three felonious prop-
erty offenses, a sentencing court nonetheless would have retained the constitutional au-
thority to reimpose a life sentence upon Rummel if, for example, his record had included 
three felony convictions for armed robbery. 
107. 445 U.S. at 281 ("It is a matter of common knowledge that prosecutors often 
exercise their discretion in invoking recidivist statutes or in plea bargaining so as to 
screen out truly 'petty' offenders who fall within the literal terms of such statutes."). 
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amendment. Courts should not abdicate this essential function 
when confronted with challenges to felony prison terms - effec-
tuation of the· constitutional prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment requires nothing less than uncompromising 
judicial review. The Supreme Court's decision in Rummel to jet-
tison proportionality review of sentence length remains unper-
suasive; state courts should preserve an area within their own 
constitutional law that would afford relief to defendants such as 
William Rummel. 
-Thomas F. Cavalier 
